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1. Introduction
When we teach Reading and Writing, what is it that we teach? To be
sure, we have perfectly acceptable answers provided by specialists, who
can enumerate the sub-skills involved in both abilities and can devise ap-
propriate methods to instill them. I propose here, however, to venture in
a different (one could say, the opposite) direction. Rather than treat read-
ing and writing as primary school skills, forming the bulk of the three R’s,
which can be subsequently refined in an academic context, I would like
to view them as the most basic terms of human existence. The main aim
of my paper is to present in a credible way such a philosophical perspec-
tive. Once this (admittedly dizzy) vantage point is established, I will try
to formulate a few scattered remarks on the nature of reading and writ-
ing in the usual sense as well as on the mundane activities we perform
in the classroom.
The perspective I want to adopt may be called with equal right-
ness “phenomenological” or “hermeneutical” (a double-barreled version
is in use: one may practice “hermeneutical phenomenology” or “phe-
nomenological hermeneutics”). These converging approaches have dif-
ferent pedigrees. Phenomenology is rooted in philosophical attempts to
get rid of (or overcome, or “sublate” in the Hegelian jargon) dualisms like
“matter vs. spirit” or “body vs. mind.” Such attempts are motivated by
the fact that philosophy (as opposed to science) is loath to adopt arbitrary
assumptions (which science calls “hypothetical” and is engaged in an end-
less project of verifying or falsifying). The dualisms mentioned (like many
others) are clearly arbitrary, since there is no conceivable “bridge” be-
tween entities which are defined as incommensurable (e.g. “extension” vs.
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“consciousness”). Thus, philosophy has been on a quest for a more capa-
cious vision of things, embracing partial (and contradictory) perspectives.
Phenomenology is a radical attempt of this kind, temporarily suspend-
ing any existing formulations (“bracketing” the world) in order to study
“what appears” without any presuppositions.
Hermeneutics, on the other hand, is rooted in practical attempts to
interpret texts which pose difficulties of various kinds. Traditionally, three
types of such ventures are distinguished. Biblical hermeneutics aims to
interpret the word of God: what it really means. Legal hermeneutics tries
to fathom the significance of abstract codifications in particular situa-
tions (in countries relying on legal codes) or to extend the significance
of particular rulings in unprecedented circumstances (in common law
countries). And finally, philological hermeneutics attempts to remove ob-
scurities from texts belonging to foreign (or even extinct) cultures. All
these ventures have at least one thing in common: they look for live or
actual meaning of messages which are not transparent, which defy un-
derstanding.
The marriage of phenomenology and hermeneutics is justified by the
fact that “what appears” after bracketing standard (hypothetical) expla-
nations of the world is not a direct, indubitable source of knowledge.
Phenomena are not transparent: they are rather like ambiguous messages
which must be further elucidated. This is best seen with “illusions” – fig-
ures which are perceived in a surprising or contradictory manner. For
instance, the same configuration of lines we learn to draw at school in or-
der to represent a cube on a flat page is perceived as two different cubes
which in turn (and quite unpredictably) give way one to another. Such
“gestalt flips” reveal the fact that the world does not manifests itself to us
in a direct manner: what we perceive is necessarily mediated, based on
an interpretation of data.
Such acts of interpretation may be automatic in the case of illusions
but they require a great deal of conscious effort in various “aha” phe-
nomena, when a problematic situation – defying comprehension in stan-
dard terms – suddenly becomes transparent: a gestalt flip occurs thanks
to a novel formulation, or a reconfiguration of available data. To give an
example, a group of researchers encountered a problem with a new mate-
rial for paintbrush – synthetic bristle – which did not paint smoothly. After
a long process of eliminating various conjectures, the problem was solved
when someone noticed that the paintbrush is a kind of pump (this rather
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distant analogy stemmed from an actual observation: painters sometimes
“vibrate” brushes). The analogy helped the group to change the focus
from the shape of bristle to the gaps between bristles, and consequently
to improve the product (Schoen 1979).
These introductory remarks are hopefully sufficient as an indica-
tion what phenomenological hermeneutics (or hermeneutical phenome-
nology) is after. Taking apparently direct experience as its point of depar-
ture (“what appears” – the phenomenological barrel), it aims to reveal the
underlying layers of mediation, the infrastructure of interpretation which
makes experience meaningful in one way or another (the hermeneutical
barrel). This venture – as I will try to show in the next section – leads to
an apparently paradoxical “recognition that I can read only the autobiog-
raphy I have always already been writing, or again, I can write only the
autobiography I have always already been reading” (Russon 2004: 80).
Once this paradox is dispelled in the next section, I will try in the last
one to say something on the nature of reading and writing as they are
normally understood and taught in the classroom.
2. Experience as My Text
Let me start with the easier notion that the world of experience is a kind
of text. This is not a new idea, as we can see from a remark made by
brother William of Baskerville to his disciple:
“My good Adso,” my master said, “during our whole journey I have been
teaching you to recognize the evidence through which the world speaks to
us like a great book. Alanus de Insulis said that
omnis mundi creatura
quasi liber et scriptura
nobis est in speculum
and he was thinking of the endless array of symbols with which God, through
His creatures, speaks to us of the eternal life. But the universe is even more
talkative than Alanus thought, and it speaks not only of the ultimate things
(which it does always in an obscure fashion) but also of closer things, and
then it speaks quite clearly.” (Eco 1984: 23–24)
The idea that the Universe embodies a meaningful design can be found
already in Plato. One can also argue that modern science is engaged in
“reading the book of Nature” (cf. Kosso 1992). The same goes, we may
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add, for detective science deciphering the book of human crime, as epit-
omized in the popular perception by Sherlock Holmes. Eco invented
a character rivaling the great prototype and produced a riveting crime
story, but – being a postmodern semanticist – he added a twist, thus “de-
constructing” the genre. As William tells his arch-enemy Jorge: “I con-
ceived a false pattern to interpret the moves of the guilty man, and the
guilty man fell in with it. And it was the same false pattern that put me on
your trail” (Eco 1984: 470). And he subsequently lectures Adso:
“Perhaps the mission of those who love mankind is to make people laugh at
the truth, to make truth laugh, because the only truth lies in learning to free
ourselves from insane passion for the truth.”
“But, master,” I ventured, sorrowfully, “you speak like this now because you
are wounded in the depths of your spirit. There is one truth, however, that
you discovered tonight, the one you reached by interpreting the clues you
read over the past few days. Jorge has won, but you defeated Jorge because
you exposed his plot . . .”
“There was no plot,” William said, “and I discovered it by mistake.”
(Eco 1984: 491)
Much later, in his final statement, Adso reaches a similarly pessimistic
conclusion:
(. . .) the more I repeat to myself the story that has emerged (. . .), the less
I manage to understand whether in it there is a design that goes beyond the
natural sequence of the events and times that connect them. And it is a hard
thing for this old monk, on the threshold of death, not to know whether the
letter he has written contains some hidden meaning, or more than one, or
many, or none at all. (Eco 1984: 501)
The dissolution of the belief that the book of nature (the text of history, of
human life, or even of a particular sequence of events) can be deciphered
in a unique and unquestionable manner has been repeatedly articulated
in philosophy and science (from ancient skeptics to modern relativists)
and enacted in art (recently, quite memorably in Mamet’s House of games
or Homicide). Does this mean that we are forced to accept Adso’s last
words: “stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus” (Eco 1984:
502; “the rose of yesterday remains only in name; we hold nothing but
names”)?
This nominalist position is not far away from modern “conventional-
ism” or “constructivism”: since the universe out there is accessible only
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in a fragmented manner via our limited sensory channels, it eludes com-
prehension; on the basis of available, unquestionable evidence we can
produce any number of intelligible texts (ultimately, no better than fig-
ments of our imagination, even if pragmatically necessary or adequate).
Thus, we have come a long way from the ancient belief that the world
is a text that reveals its Author’s plan to the modern conviction that the
world of experience can be merely more or less intelligently shaped into
various competing narratives. From this perspective, as pointed out by
Merleau-Ponty, “reflection is a system of thought no less closed than in-
sanity, with this difference that it understands itself and the madman too,
whereas the madman does not understand it” (2002: 27).
Is there a way out? How can one be truly “open” to the world? Let
us first notice that the modern account of “experience as my text” is du-
alist: there is some raw, unquestionable (or undeniable, as the case may
be) evidence which one can put one’s “spin” on. In more radical ver-
sions, the chaos of initial experience is subsequently ordered into some
intelligible patterns and structures along mostly pragmatic lines. In other
words, there is something given in my bodily experience (something
present) which is next mentally elaborated as my text. In order to over-
come this dualism of objective “presence” and subjective “interpretation,”
hermeneutical phenomenology uncovers the necessary (or transcenden-
tal) conditions of presence (or that something appears). I will recount be-
low John Russon’s account, who in turn discusses Hegel’s argumentation
(Russon 2004: 18–21, 54–5, 70–80).
First of all, in order to interact with the world, I must belong to the
same type of reality – I must be of the world as a spatial and temporal
object. Additionally, in order to experience the world, I cannot just be
placed within it as an object but must also be a subject: an intentional
body which is open, sensitive to the form of the other. As such, I must be
able to contrast my “here” with my “there” – my there with which I am
consubstantial (we must remember the proviso that dualisms are ruled
out as arbitrary). Thus, I must have an identity which straddles myself
and my other. The other must be a meaning of my body. How can “there,”
“the other” be a bodily meaning?
“The other” can be a meaning for my body only if I could be “there.”
It must be a possibility inherent in my existence “here” – in my openness
to its form. Thus, I must be able to move to reach it (movement opens
the temporal dimension). Additionally, in order to notice the other, I can-
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not just be immersed in it – I must be able to oppose it to myself, to
point it. This requires a pointer, a sign: something that does not present
itself as such, but as something to be bypassed in favor of what it points
to. We can see now that something can appear, can be present, only if
it is presented by a sign. In other words, presence presupposes some
minimal “writing” – a bodily act of expressing of what is. Thus, we may
say, seeing is always reading what one has already inscribed into reality.
Consequently, to return to our starting point, the dualism of objective
“presence” and subjective “interpretation” is shown not to be primary.
Presence – appearance – is already interpretive, it rests on some minimal
tools of expression, or “language.”
It is important to realize that in this approach the “body” is not just
something material and able to move (“move” in the general sense: plants
may be stationary but they move while growing; sedentary animals have
moving parts). One’s “body” is what allows one to realize one’s desires (or
needs, if we want a wider term to cover lower organisms). Thus in the
case of human beings, as is well shown by developmental psychologists,
one’s material body is not one’s own from the start – it must be appropri-
ated in action. The material body is turned into one’s body when it exists
as the expression of one’s will. When learning to control “its own” body,
the child develops the division between oneself and others. In this pro-
cess the primary appropriation of one’s body is, with the passage of time,
reproduced on a larger level when one develops habits of interaction with
things and other people. Through habituation what was alien and resis-
tant becomes “one’s own” – the medium for one’s own self-expression and
self-realization. In short, one’s extended body (if this formulation seems
far-fetched, one should recall how easily we appropriate the potential for
extraordinary movement inherent in various vehicles or sport gear, which
are integrated into our “body schema”; but the most obvious confirmation
of the presence of extended bodies comes from our deep, existential iden-
tification with various social collectives, be it a marital union or a body
politic).
We may now pass from the notion of minimal “writing” and “read-
ing” – possible for all sentient beings – to something possible only for
ourselves. Hegel analyzes this passage in his famous discussion of the
master / slave relationship (cf. Russon 2004: 72 ff.). An individual who is
not opposed in any way by other selves may function as the center of her
world (we may think in this context of the child who acts like a little tyrant:
On Reading and Writing 123
it is enough to cry to get whatever she craves). This primitive form of self-
-consciousness – that one may do what one wants – must be transformed
if one is to develop. In particular, one must recognize one’s dependence
on other selves, which means setting up mutually acceptable patterns of
behavior. The first logical step in this process is a clash of selves. Since
they recognize nothing opposing their will, the natural outcome (accord-
ing to Hegel) is the struggle to the death to show the other self that one
is the real center of the world and that one by risking one’s life does not
depend on it. The struggle may be stopped if one of the fighters recog-
nizes the other as the real center (master), and thus acknowledges her
dependence on her own life, while simultaneously the other fighter rec-
ognizes her as slave. This mutual recognition serves as the basis of social
institutions within which the subsequent communal life is lived.
However, a mutual recognition is possible only if both parties can
communicate it. The loser, who is the initiator of the deal, must be able to
change her body from an unconscious medium allowing the satisfaction
of her will into a self-conscious medium of expression of the will. In short,
she must turn the essence of her body into gesture. The winner, on the
other hand, must be able to recognize her as gesturing and to understand
the gesture involved. In this basic scenario, the slave-to-be “writes” a text
– offers a totalized expression which embodies a unified intent and which
“calls out” to be read – while the master-to-be recognizes and “reads” this
text. Thus, an act of reading, or interpretation, involves “totalization” and
“unification”: the decision to recognize some determinate extent (material
totality) as signifier and the positing of some determinate intent as signi-
fied. The criterion of truth in the reading under discussion is a successful
communication: a recognition and an adequate interpretation of the in-
tent expressed. One must realize, however, that both writing and reading
are open-ended projects: one can never rest assured that one has com-
municated oneself or understood the other as long as one’s projection of
consequences is not borne out by the behavior of the other party.
Here, at last, we may begin to appreciate the enormous difference
between the standard, relativist interpretation of “experience as my text”
and the interpretation I have been trying to offer above. The former dual-
ist position divides experience into a passive “objective” part (something
simply appears, it is present) and an active “subjective” part (we read it in
our way, we put our spin on it). According to the latter position, something
may appear only if it is mediated by our body, which writes and reads si-
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multaneously. At the lower level of sentience, the body writes, because
it unconsciously turns some totality of experience into a sign for an ex-
istentially important content (food, mating partner, predator), and reads,
because it enacts this text, it immediately follows this inscription in its be-
havior. At the higher level of self-consciousness, the body as the system
of life support changes its essence to become the body as self-expression.
The body writes when it gestures, or produces a material totality to ex-
press its intent. The body reads when it recognizes such a totality and is
able to discover a unified intent in it.
In the master and slave story discussed above I presented the slave
as writing and the master as reading. How can this be reconciled with the
paradoxical idea introduced in the first section that we can read only what
we have always been writing and we can write only what we have always
been reading? The answer hinges on the notion of the body. Hegel’s story
describes the logic of its transformation from life support into gesture,
from animality into humanity (to be sure, gestures are present in the ani-
mal kingdom but they have a different status there, which I cannot hope
to elucidate at this point). Once this threshold is crossed – and we can
assume this is the case with all human beings (with possible exceptions
in the case of serious anomalies, e.g. people with debilitating organic de-
fects, or feral children perhaps) – the body is never just the system of life
support but always already gesture. Apparently, this is true in some ways
already for infants who focus their attention on their mother’s gestures
(as first manifested by the movements of their eyes; in this they differ
from new-born babies of higher primates). Thus, very early on human
beings participate in “extended bodies” engaged in simultaneous writ-
ing and reading.
It is crucial to realize that the body in question is an intersubjec-
tive collective, within which particular subjects perform roles ascribed to
them by the logic of a given community (that is, ascribed in the light of
its legitimate aims). In the mother/child relationship the roles are clearly
different and (at least at first) extremely unequal. For some time the child
cannot even be said to “perform” its role – it grows up into it, becom-
ing self-conscious in the process. The mother, of course, is self-conscious
from the start and knows the general logic of this extended body (as in-
scribed by her culture, which offers various paradigms of a “good mother,”
“normal child,” “happy family” and so on). But while reading the partic-
ular text of her relationship with her child (the history they have written
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together in unequal parts, their autobiography), she may encounter ob-
stacles which may force her to reevaluate, and consequently to rewrite
the part she plays (“Am I a good mother?”; “Is this what motherhood
is about?”; “What should I do for my child in this extraordinary situa-
tion?”). The texts – the autobiographies – written by particular bodies of
one kind or another will influence in the long run the general shape and
self-perception of a given body type (e.g. “what is modern family?”).
To be sure, I have only started to develop this perspective and I am
afraid that I have raised more questions than I answered. At this point,
I may only hope that the vantage point is firm enough to allow me to make
a few observations on the nature of reading and writing in the standard
sense and on our pedagogical attempts in these domains.
3. Concluding Remarks
Let me start with the famous statement made by Flaubert about his most
notorious protagonist – quoted as the motto to this essay – which may
seem now much less paradoxical, or even quite straightforward. To some
extent, a writer must identify with all her characters and her writing is
always in some ways autobiographical. Writing proper is self-expression
not in the limited “subjective” sense – that one expresses one’s “inner
self” – but in the extended sense I tried to sketch above: the writer par-
ticipates in various larger bodies and may aspire to contribute to their
self-comprehension (this is, of course, not necessary: mediocre or merely
clever writers run in the automatic mode, following standard expecta-
tions). The largest such body is “common humanity” – this explains why
good actors performing the part of an entirely obnoxious, corrupt or
plainly evil character invariably search for a “human touch” in the life of
their protagonist, so that they themselves, and their audience, can iden-
tify with the “monster” (and thus be able to get involved in the story in
a deeper, existential sense).
Such acts of “identification” with fictional characters come natu-
rally to us. Most boys in Poland identified themselves at some stage
with Kmicic, Wołodyjowski, Tomek Wilmowski or Hans Kloss. I am
less knowledgeable about girls, but Anne Shirley (of Green Gables etc.),
Pippi Langstrumpf (that one for tomboys) or Scarlett O’Hara (for some-
what older ones) come to mind. We tend to assume that only children
identify with fictional heroes (their “role models”) in a potentially life-
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transforming manner because they are in the process of developing a sta-
ble identity. Grown-up readers are not supposed to impersonate their fa-
vorite protagonists but merely to “bracket” their humdrum existence in
fleeting acts of identification with their heroes (hence the label “escapist
literature”). Madame Bovary – and most famously Don Quixote – serve as
literary warnings against shaping one’s life according to fictional models.
But the popular perception of the role of fiction – basically, as enter-
tainment – is wide of the mark. Fiction (whether in literature, or more
and more often in film and “virtual reality”) is not about a temporary dis-
traction, or only on the face of it. We crave fiction because we have the
ingrained need to identify with things and people, to form extended bod-
ies, while fiction provides perhaps the best medium in this respect. To
be sure, if the account in the previous section holds water, all intercourse
with reality is nothing else but a participation in one’s extended bodies.
But in the daily treadmill everything worthwhile comes at a price: of ef-
fort, risk, frustration, or even humiliation and defeat. The only price for
participation in fictional extended bodies (apart from the ticket) seems to
be a “willing suspension of disbelief.”
Coleridge’s formula (whatever its original application) is not, how-
ever, apt as a description of (the conditions of) fictional experience. It is
based on an opposition between what is credible (whether in life, or in
“accepted” forms of art) and what is, at least initially, outlandish, opposed
to standard expectations, or even bereft of sense. But the latter state of
affairs is exactly what holds our interest, makes the fictional experience
potentially illuminating (rather than merely “cathartic” – any trashy rom-
com will do for an emotional release). Thus, if one suspends anything, it is
not “disbelief” but rather standard “reading habits.” Even if many readers
(viewers) like to read (watch) only what they already like, fiction – by de-
finition – offers a sphere unconstrained by the limitations of daily routine
and, as a consequence, continuously transforms its languages, styles of
expression.
Why should one want to extend and refine one’s reading habits (here,
to conclude, we come closer to the academic context)? There are probably
many adequate answers, depending on one’s station in life, but I would
like to put forward here just one, linked to the metaphysical context
described previously. Reading – in the general sense – aims at under-
standing texts written by “our extended body.” The body in question is
Academia, which leaves its members (de iure) the most complete free-
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dom to read and write, or to “couple with reality” in the theoretical mode
(that is, to interpret phenomena by developing various styles of question-
ing, or expressing, them). This tremendous freedom of inquiry is built on
the foundation of responsibility: members are obliged to communicate
and criticize their findings – to write and read in the standard sense of
the words – as transparently as they can (it is only superficially paradox-
ical that the greater the freedom, the greater the necessary discipline,
but this is another story). Thus, clarity of expression and responsibility in
interpretation are primary virtues to be instilled within the walls of the
Academia. I wish I had something more specific to say on this matter –
the task remains to be taken up in another exploration.
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